Abstract. Disaggregation of sectoral energy use and greenhouse gas emissions trends reveals striking differences between sectors and regions of the world. Understanding key driving forces in the energy end-use sectors provides insights for development of projections of future greenhouse gas emissions. This report examines global and regional historical trends in energy use and carbon emissions in the industrial, buildings, transport, and agriculture sectors, with a more detailed focus on industry and buildings. Activity and economic drivers as well as trends in energy and carbon intensity are evaluated. We show that macro-economic indicators, such as GDP, are insufficient for comprehending trends and driving forces at the sectoral level. These indicators need to be supplemented with sector-specific information for a more complete understanding of future energy use and greenhouse gas emissions.
Introduction 1
Future projections of greenhouse gas emissions rely on a number of variables for predicting trends in energy use, including both the level of energy demand and the various sources used to provide this energy. Macro-economic models use historical data as well as estimates of future population, gross domestic product (GDP), autonomous energy efficiency improvement rates, elasticities, and energy prices to determine energy demand levels. These variables, however, do not clearly explain all of the driving forces behind historical or future energy use patterns. As such, more detailed socio-economic and technical information is needed by policy analysts and policymakers. Only with such information can they identify greenhouse gas mitigation measures and formulate policies to implement these measures.
Greenhouse gas emissions from energy use, predominately in the form of carbon emissions, are the result of burning carboniferous fossil fuels. This paper reviews historical trends in energy use and carbon emissions and provides insights on driving forces such as economics, activity levels, and energy and carbon intensity trends. To improve our understanding of global energy use and carbon emissions trends and relationships, we focus on the key sectors of the economy that use energy: industry, buildings, transport, and agriculture. To gain insight on regional trends, we divide the world into four categories based on similar economic development characteristics: industrialized countries, economies in transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EITs), developing countries in Asia/Pacific (DC-AP), and the rest of the world (ROW).
2
The industrial sector is extremely diverse, encompassing the extraction of natural resources, conversion into raw materials, and manufacture of finished products. Five energy-intensive industrial sub-sectors 4 account for roughly 45% of all industrial energy consumption (iron and steel, chemicals, petroleum refining, pulp and paper, and cement). These industries are generally engaged in the transformation of raw material inputs (e.g. iron ore, crude oil, wood) into usable materials and products for an economy. Throughout this paper, we focus on the iron and steel industry when discussing energy-intensive industry.
Energy use in residential and commercial buildings varies throughout the world, reflecting differing climatic conditions, building construction practices, appliance and equipment penetrations, and overall levels of energy demand. Residential buildings range from single-family, detached dwellings to multifamily apartment complexes. Energy consumption levels depend on building shell features such as insulation levels and the energy-efficiency of windows as well as the number of energy-using appliances, how these appliances are used, and their energy-efficiency. Energy use in commercial buildings is also related to features of the building shell and appliance and equipment penetration levels; analysts have shown a strong relationship between commercial building type and energy use.
Transport sector development is easy to quantify; world vehicle stocks, fuel consumption and fuel prices are well known. In addition, there has been considerable modeling in the transport sector, probably because of the high degree of government involvement in transport infrastructure planning. Transport energy use can be disaggregated into passenger and freight transport, and by modes such as automobile, truck, rail, ship, or air. Road transport, both passenger and commercial, accounts for the vast majority of total transport energy use.
Commercial energy is used in the agriculture sector for equipment, irrigation, drying, horticulture, and raising livestock. Energy use for production of fertilizers and pesticides is not included in this sector bur rather is accounted for in the industrial sector. Non-commercial energy, an important element of traditional agriculture, is also not included in this discussion. Due to a lack of detailed information on this sector, we do not include it in our discussion of sectoral driving forces.
The goal of this report is to provide historical sectoral-level energy and carbon emissions data as well as an understanding of the key underlying drivers of energy use and carbon emissions in two of the end-use sectors: industry and buildings. Such information is helpful for the development of energy use and carbon emissions scenarios because it provides modelers with a historical basis from which to extrapolate trends as well as information on how various factors such as population, energy intensity, and structural trends affect energy use and associated greenhouse gas emissions.
We first discuss historical trends in energy use and greenhouse gas emissions by end-use sector for four world regions. After that, we examine activity and economic drivers of energy use and greenhouse gas emissions in the industrial, buildings, and transport sector. Next we discuss energy and carbon intensity trends by sector. We conclude by commenting on how these historical trends and drivers can be used in the development of greenhouse gas emissions scenarios. 6 inputs to electricity production contain fuels that are used in electricity plants (both public and autoproducer plants) and fuels that are used for electricity production in combined heat and power plants. Fuel inputs into heat production combine fuels used in heat plants (both public and autoproducer plants) and fuels that are used for heat production in combined heat and power plants. 6 Fuel inputs in combined heat and power plants are separated into fuel inputs for electricity and heat production according to the shares of electricity and heat produced in these plants. The data for fuel inputs in all power plants, as well as for electricity and heat output from each type of plant, were taken from the IEA Extended Energy Balances Database. The fuel inputs were multiplied by the respective carbon emission factors for each fuel. We calculated carbon emissions by sector for industrialized countries and selected EIT, DC-AP, and ROW countries. When aggregated, our total carbon emissions for a country or region differ from IEA values because we only include emissions from fuel combustion, electricity, and heat consumption. IEA CO 2 statistics include a number of other categories, such as unallocated non-energy use, that we did not include.
We used BP data for energy use trends in the EIT region because IEA data show growth in buildings sector energy use between 1990 and 1995 in this region, despite the serious economic difficulties experienced during this period. In contrast, BP statistics show a decline in overall buildings energy use at this time. EIT data were provided in primary units by BP. We converted these primary values to fuel and electricity values based on their shares as reported in IEA statistics for this region. Sectoral energy use shares were calculated based on a previous analysis (WEC, 1995a) . Carbon emissions for the former Soviet Union were carefully derived following a fuel-by-fuel review of IEA data that included reallocations to attempt to correct for missing or obviously erroneous data. Carbon emissions for the other EIT countries included in Table 4 were calculated using IEA data. We strongly caution the reader to recognize the uncertainty in the values presented for this region; however, we believe that these are the best sectoral level estimates of energy use and carbon emissions currently available for the EIT countries.
Additional difficulties were encountered with the data for China for 1971 and 1975, years for which official data are scarce for that country. For final energy, the reported values for industry for these years (0.96 and 1.3 EJ, respectively) represented significantly lower shares of total final energy (12% and 13%, respectively) than the 61% to 66% shares seen in 1980 . Thus, total industry values for 1971 and 1975 were adjusted to 60% of total final energy for 1971 and 1975 . Similar adjustments were made in the transport sector, where the 1971 and 1975 values were 3% and 4% of total final energy, respectively. These values were adjusted to be 6% of total final energy which is more closely aligned with the 8 to 9% experienced in later years. No values were reported for the categories of agriculture, commercial buildings, and residential buildings for China for 1971 China for and 1975 China for (except residential in 1975 . A nonspecified other value was reported for both of these years. However, adding the non-specified other (plus residential in 1975) , industry, and transport values does not result in the reported total final consumption value for these sectors. To resolve this discrepancy, the reported values for non-specified other for 1971 and 1975 were not used; instead non-specified other was calculated as the difference between the adjusted industry and transport values and total final consumption. This non-specified other category was then allocated to agriculture, commercial buildings, and residential buildings based on the 1980 shares of these end-use sectors. Similar adjustments and reallocations were made to the electricity values for 1971 and 1975 for China.
We compared the IEA data for China to Chinese national statistics for the years 1980 to 1990 (Sinton, 1996) . Final energy use was virtually the same in all sectors for all years, except for the residential sector 7 in 1990 (national statistics were 1.4 EJ higher than IEA statistics) and the industrial sector for all three years (national statistics were 2.6 EJ, 3.4 EJ, and 5.1 EJ higher that IEA statistics in 1980 IEA statistics in , 1985 IEA statistics in , and 1990 . We use IEA statistics in this paper, but caution the reader that more research is needed to understand the differences between IEA statistics and Chinese national statistics.
Methodology
This report presents historical energy use and carbon emissions trends and discusses the underlying drivers of these trends. The main factors affecting growth of carbon emissions in an economy include the rate of population growth, the size and structure of the economy (depending on consumption patterns and stage of development), the amount of energy consumed per unit of activity, and the specific carbon emissions of the fuel mix used. Our discussion of the drivers is guided by the terms of the so-called Kaya identity (Kaya, 1989) We have redefined the terms slightly to more closely match the available data and the characteristics of the end-use sectors that we focus on in this paper. Thus, our discussion is structured as given by equation 2. The various terms are defined differently in each end-use sector. For example, while activity is generally linked to population in all sectors, it also includes commodity production levels in the industrial sector, number of persons per household in the residential sector and cubic meters of building space in the commercial sector.
We begin with a discussion of historical energy use and carbon emissions trends in Section 3. This is followed in Section 4 with a more detailed discussion of the energy use and carbon emissions drivers and terms in equation 2 for the industrial and buildings sectors. We discuss the main drivers for these sectors and explain trends and regional variations. Understanding these factors enables calibration of models to trends observed in the past.
Historical Trends in Energy Use and Carbon Emissions

Primary Energy Demand
Global primary energy use grew from 191 EJ in 1971 to 307 EJ in 1990 at an average annual growth rate (AAGR) of 2.5% per year. This growth tapered off in all sectors after 1990, with total global primary energy increasing to only 319 EJ by 1995 (see Table 1 ), mainly due to the large declines experienced in the EIT region because of the political and economic restructuring in many of those countries. Figure 1 shows that the industrial sector clearly dominates total primary energy use, followed by the buildings sector (commercial and residential buildings combined), the transport sector, and the agriculture sector. Figure 2 shows that between 1971 and 1990, the largest annual growth was experienced in the commercial buildings and agriculture sectors. After 1990, these trends shifted, with transport experiencing the fastest growth, while very little growth was seen in the industrial sector. 
Primary Energy Demand: Industry
In 1990, industry accounted for 42% (129 EJ) of global energy use. Between 1971 and 1990, industrial energy use grew at a rate of 2.1% per year, slightly less than the world total energy demand growth of 2.5% per year. This growth rate has slowed in recent years, and was virtually flat between 1990 and 1995, primarily because of declines in industrial output in the EIT region. Energy use in the industrial sector is dominated by the industrialized countries, which accounted for 42% of world industrial energy use in 1990. Countries in the EIT, DC-AP, and ROW regions used 29%, 20%, and 9% of world industrial energy use, respectively, that year (see Table 2 ).
Industrial energy consumption in the industrialized countries increased at an average rate of 0.6% per year between 1971 and 1990, from 49 EJ to 54 EJ. The share of industrial sector energy consumption within the industrialized countries declined from 40% in 1971 to 33% in 1995. This decline partly reflects the transition toward a less energy-intensive manufacturing base, as well as the continued growth in transportation demand, resulting in large part from the rising importance of personal mobility in passenger transport use. The industrial sector dominates in the EIT, accounting for more than 50% of total primary energy demand, the result of the long-term policy emphasizing materials production that was promoted under years of central planning. Average annual growth in industrial energy use in this region was 2.0% between 1971 and 1990 (from 26 EJ to 38 EJ), but dropped by an average of -7.3% per year between 1990 and 1995.
In the DC-AP region, the industrial sector accounted for between 57% and 60% of primary energy consumption during the period 1971 to 1995. Industrial energy use grew rapidly between 1971 and 1995, with an annual average growth rate of 5.9%, jumping from 9 EJ to 35 EJ. The fastest growth in this sector was seen in China and in other rapidly-developing Asian countries. Sector and Region, 1971-1995 (EJ) . Reference: IEA, 1997a; IEA, 1997b; BP, 1997 . 1960 1971 1975 1980 1985 AAGR 1960 AAGR 1971 AAGR 1990 Table 2 ). Industrialized countries clearly dominate energy consumption in this sector, using 62% of the world's transport energy in 1990, followed by the EIT (16%), the ROW region (12%), and the DC-AP region (10%). The most rapid growth was seen in the DC-AP countries (5.9% per year) and the ROW region (4.6% per year). Transport energy use dropped dramatically in the EIT region after 1990; by 1995 this region only consumed 11% of global transport energy use. Growth in transport primary energy use also declined slightly in the industrialized countries, dropping from an average of 2.2% per year between 1971 and 1990 to 1.9% per year between 1990 and 1995. High growth continued in the DC-AP and ROW regions, with the DC-AP countries increasing to an average of 7.6% per year between 1990 and 1995.
Primary Energy Demand: Agriculture
The agriculture sector used only 3% of global primary commercial energy in 1990. Unlike the other sectors, the EIT region dominated agricultural energy use in 1990, using 34% of the total, followed by the industrialized countries (30%), DC-AP (26%) and the ROW (10%) regions (see Table 2 ). Between 1971 and 1990, average annual growth in primary energy used for agriculture was slower in the industrialized countries (2.2% per year) than in the three other regions which ranged between 4.5% and 4.8% per year. Trends in agricultural primary energy use changed significantly in the EIT and ROW regions after 1990, with EIT consumption dropping an average of 10.6% per year and ROW consumption increasing an average of 12.6% per year through 1995.
Final Energy Demand: Fuels and Electricity
Final energy use grew more slowly than primary energy use in all regions between 1971 and 1995. Fuels dominate final energy use, but the share of fuels dropped from 90% in 1971 to 83% in 1995, reflecting an increased growth in electricity associated with growing urbanization and electrification in many areas of the world. Figure 3 shows that the share of electricity in final energy grew in all regions, although this growth slowed in the EIT region after 1985.
Globally, electricity use grew at an average rate of 4.3% between 1971 and 1990 (see Table 3 ), significantly higher than the 2.5% and 2.1% per year growth seen in global primary and final energy use, respectively. The highest annual growth rates in electricity use were in the DC-AP and ROW regions, which averaged 8.6% and 7.2% per year, respectively, between 1971 and 1990. Total electricity use was highest in the industrialized countries, which used 60% of global electricity in 1990. Figure 4 shows that commercial buildings had both the largest growth and highest total electricity consumption, followed by residential buildings, industry, and agricultural. Transport consumes very little electricity; electricity's share in final energy in this sector remained virtually unchanged throughout the period. Both commercial and residential buildings showed the largest growth in electricity, averaging about 5.3% per year between 1971 and 1990. Growth in industrial sector electricity averaged 3.5% per year. Table 3 . Electricity Use by Sector and Region, 1971-1995 (EJ) . Reference: IEA, 1997a; IEA, 1997b; BP, 1997 . 1960 1971 1975 1980 1985 AAGR 1960 AAGR 1971 AAGR 1990 Industrialized countries were responsible for almost half of the world's carbon dioxide emissions (see Table 4 ). In these countries, the buildings sector had the largest emissions in 1990 (915 MtC), followed by the industrial sector (887 MtC), transport (743 MtC), and agriculture (48 MtC). Industrial sector carbon dioxide emissions dropped between 1971 and 1990, at an average annual rate of -0.3% per year, while all other emissions grew.
Carbon dioxide emissions grew from 741 MtC to 1131 MtC between 1971 and 1990 in the EIT countries, declining to 892 MtC by 1995 as energy use dropped significantly as a result of the economic crisis in this region. In the former Soviet Union 8 , total carbon dioxide emissions grew from 561 MtC in 1971 to 948 MtC in 1990, at an average rate of 2.8% per year. Following the start of economic restructuring, carbon dioxide emissions in the former Soviet Union dropped to 733 MtC in 1995. In 1990, the industrial sector was responsible for 53% of carbon dioxide emissions in the former Soviet Union, followed by the buildings sector (31%), agriculture (9%), and transport (7%). IEA, 1997a; IEA, 1997b; IEA, 1997c . 1960 1971 1975 1980 1985 AAGR 1960 AAGR 1971 AAGR 1990 
Drivers of Energy Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Industry and Buildings
Key drivers of energy use and carbon emissions include activity drivers (total population growth, urbanization, building and vehicle stock, commodity production), economic drivers (total GDP, income and price elasticities), energy intensity trends (energy intensity of energy-using equipment and appliances), and carbon intensity trends. These factors are in turn driven by changes in consumer preferences, energy and technology costs, settlement and infrastructure patterns, technical change, and overall economic conditions. This section focuses on key drivers in the industrial and buildings sectors.
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In the industrial sector, energy-intensive industries account for approximately 50% of industrial energy use worldwide and we focus on a specific energy-intensive sub-sector, the iron and steel industry. Buildings trends and drivers are discussed for the entire buildings sector as well as for commercial and residential buildings separately when possible.
Activity Drivers of Energy Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Population is the fundamental activity driver and all sectoral-level activity drivers are influenced by trends in population growth. Between 1970 and 1990, world population increased 30%, with the bulk of growth in the DC-AP and ROW regions (UN, 1996) . Globally, this increase averaged 1.8% per year, led by 2.6% average annual growth in the ROW region and 2.0% average annual growth in the DC-AP region. Industrialized countries and the EIT both had moderate population growth, averaging 0.8% per year. World population growth slowed between 1990 and 1995, averaging only 1.5% per year.
Sectoral-level activity, while driven by trends in population growth, is measured differently in each of the end use sectors; in industry activity is based on commodities produced and in buildings it is based on number of households or square meters of living or commercial space. Regardless of how activity is measured, though, there are factors specific to each sub-sector that drive activity levels, which in turn are related to energy use and greenhouse gas emissions.
Industrial Sector Activity Drivers
Generally, industrial production has been growing in most economies. Industrial production can be measured using either economic or physical indices. At an aggregate level, monetary values such as value added, value of shipments, and production value are the most commonly used terms for describing production, although various physical production indices are available to measure production of specific commodities. Manufacturing value added per capita has been growing in most regions, except there has been a decline recently in the EIT region and in most African countries over the past 15 years. The share of manufacturing value added of GDP is around 30% for most regions in the world, as shown in Figure 5 . The only exception is the EIT region which has a very large share of industrial production in the economy. 10 The economic transition process occurring in these countries has led to a severe reduction of industrial production in recent years.
Figure 5 also shows that the share of manufacturing value added is increasing in countries such as those in the DC-AP region, while showing a small decline in the economies of industrialized countries due to continuous restructuring away from industrial activities and toward more service activities. For example, the industrial sector share dropped from 42% in 1970 to 35% in 1990 in the Western Europe region, while increasing from 24% to 33% and from 27% to 40% in China and Eastern Asia, respectively. In the former Soviet Union, the manufacturing share dropped from 60% to 55% during this period (RIVM, 1998) . The industrial sector is dominated by the production of a few major energy-intensive commodities such as steel, paper, cement, and chemicals. In any given country or region, production of these basic commodities follows the general development of the overall economy. Rapidly industrializing countries will have higher demands for infrastructure materials and more mature markets will have declining or stable consumption levels. Global steel production increased from 28 Mtonnes in 1900 to 730 Mtonnes in 1994 (IISI, 1996) , at an average growth of 3.4% per year (see Figure 6 ). In the industrialized countries, steel production is growing slowly, at a rate of just over 1% per year, and is expected to level off in the near future (Wödlinger et al., 1997) . Steel production in the EIT region declined in recent years due to the economic restructuring process. In contrast, production of steel in developing countries has been 6.6% per year on average (IISI, 1996) , and is expected to be the main driver for continued growth in global steel production. Recently, the Asian region experienced high average annual growth in steel production of about 7.5% per year. In the medium term Asia is expected to be main growing consumer of steel. The low per capita consumption of steel in developing countries (51 kg/capita in 1991) compared to the high levels in industrialized countries of over 300 kg/capita (IISI, 1996) , shows that there is still a large potential for growth in production in these countries.
The regional differences in consumption patterns (expressed as consumption per capita) will fuel a further growth of consumption in developing countries. Many commodities, including steel, are traded globally and regional differences in supply and demand may remain in the future. Trends also depend on regionally availability of resources (e.g. scrap) and capital. Therefore, a link between consumption and production by region is not easy to estimate or to model. Table 5 presents an overview of regional growth of steel production showing that production in industrialized countries and the EIT region, while strong in the 1950 to 1990 period, dropped considerably between 1990 and 1995. As expected, growth in production was large in both the DC-AP and ROW regions for the entire period (Wödlinger et al., 1997) . 
Buildings Sector Activity Drivers
Along with population size, key activity drivers of energy demand in buildings are rate of urbanization, number of households, per capita living area, persons per residence, and commercial floor space. As populations become more urbanized and areas become electrified, the demand for energy services such as refrigeration, lighting, heating, and cooling increases. In the residential buildings sector, the level of energy demand is further influenced by population age distribution, household income, number of households, size of households, and the number of people per household. In the commercial buildings sector, demographic factors that influence energy demand include the overall population level (i.e., the number of people desiring commercial services) and the size of the labor force.
The number of people living in urban areas increased between 1970 and 1990, growing from 1.35 billion, or 37% of total, in 1970 to 2.27 billion, or 43% of total, in 1990. Growth in urbanization was strongest in the DC-AP and ROW regions, where the average annual increase in urban population was nearly 4.0% per year (see Figure 7) . Much slower growth was seen in the already relatively urbanized industrialized 19 and EIT regions. Increasing urbanization in the DC-AP and ROW regions leads to the increased use of commercial fuels, such as kerosene and liquified petroleum gas, for cooking instead of traditional biomass fuels. Additional increases in energy use come with electrification, when appliances and lighting are adopted. In general, higher levels of urbanization are associated with higher incomes and increased household energy use (Sathaye et al., 1989; Nadel et al., 1997) .
Globally, the number of people living together in a household (defined as a separate living unit) tends to decline with increasing income and urbanization of the population. In industrialized countries, household size dropped from an average of 3.5 persons per household in 1970 to 2.8 persons per household in 1990. This decline in household size lead to an increase in the total number of households in the region, where households grew 1.5% per year faster than population between 1970 and 1991 (Schipper and Meyers, 1992) . Energy use per household declined as household size dropped; however, residential energy use per capita increased during this period (IEA, 1997d).
In the EIT region, the number of persons per household has also declined recently, dropping from 3.7 to 3.5 between 1978 and 1988 in Poland and 3.0 to 2.8 between 1980 and 1991 in the Czech Republic (Meyers et al., 1995) . In 1989, Russia and Ukraine each had an average of 3.2 persons per household (World Bank, 1995) . Much larger household sizes are common in the DC-AP and ROW regions. Either commercial sector GDP or commercial sector floor space can be used to measure activity in commercial buildings. The commercial sector share of GDP is high in industrialized countries and has been growing rapidly in recent years. A survey of ten industrialized countries showed that commercial sector GDP grew an average of 3.3% per year from 1970 to 1995, with even higher rates experienced in some countries like Japan and Finland (Schipper and Meyers, 1992) . In 1995, the overall GDP commercial sector share was 66% in thirteen industrialized countries (Krackeler et al., 1998) . Although some industrialized countries collected detailed data on commercial floor area, this is a more difficult measure of activity due to lack of data for many regions of the world. Region, 1960 , 1970 . Reference: U.N. 1996 . 
Economic Drivers of Energy Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Many macroeconomic projections of energy use and greenhouse gas emissions rely on historical data to estimate price and income elasticities for energy demand and then use projections of GDP and energy prices to generate energy and emissions projections. The relationship between total final sector energy use and economic drivers such as GDP per capita varies across countries depending upon the sector. We found a relatively strong relationship in the buildings sector and a moderate relationship in the industrial sector. Other economic indicators, such as level of economic development in the industrial sector and personal consumption expenditures in residential buildings, are more closely correlated with energy use in these sectors.
Income elasticities vary widely among different types of energy services and the country or region under consideration. For example, the income elasticity of refrigerator ownership in most industrialized countries is extremely low, as most households already own a refrigerator. The elasticity is much higher in medium-income countries with low refrigerator ownership. In general, income elasticities for ownership or use of appliances are lowest for very low income countries, highest for medium income countries where a substantial portion but not the majority of the population can afford the appliance, and intermediate for high income countries where the vast majority of the population already have access to the appliances.
Industrial Sector Economic Drivers
In the industrial sector, empirical studies have shown that economic development rather than price elasticity may be the major factor explaining trends in material intensity because elasticity of industrial demand for resources (including energy) varies widely due to the diverse activities, production cost breakdowns, and technologies used in industrial production (Evans, 1996) . Figure 8 shows that the correlation between industrial final energy use and GDP 11 is moderate (R 2 = 0.6). This measure, which includes the energy intensity of industrial production, the structure of the industrial sector, and the demand for industrial production illustrates that modeling trends in industrial energy consumption is not straightforward.
Greenhouse gas emissions and energy use by industry are still dominated by a relatively small number of basic energy-intensive industries (WEC, 1995a) . These industries are primarily involved in upgrading natural resources to materials used in society and are relatively large emitters of pollutants and greenhouse gases (Jänicke et al., 1997) . Material consumption is still increasing and this growth is apparent for "classic" materials (e.g. cement, steel) and for the "new" materials (e.g. plastics, aluminium). Studies of material consumption in industrialized countries have shown that consumption (expressed as apparent consumption per capita or unit GDP 12 ) increases in the initial development of society to a maximum, and eventually saturates or even declines. Trends in materials use in industrialized countries show saturation on a per capita basis. Expressed as function of unit GDP, material intensity declines after reaching a maximum (Williams et al., 1987) .
In Figure 9 the historical trends in apparent consumption of steel are depicted for the U.S. and Germany expressed as consumption of steel per capita and per unit GDP. The initial increase is caused by large investments required in building an industrial infrastructure. In later stages, material substitution and competition between materials as well as a shift to a more service-oriented economy contribute to a decrease in the material intensity of societies (Malenbaum, 1975; Williams et al., 1987; Bernardini and Galli,1993) . For example, the substitution of classical steels by aluminium in transport applications led to the development of high strength steels that can compete with aluminium. Because of improved properties, less material is needed to fulfill the service, leading to declining material intensities. The inverse U-shaped curve as developed by Malenbaum (1975) cannot always explain irregular developments in material intensity trends (Evans, 1996) . Recycling appears to increase with development (Bernardini and Galli, 1993) , as can be seen from the increasing post-consumer recycling rates in the industrialized world. The development curves seem not only to be valid for construction materials but also for other commodities like food (Bernardini and Galli, 1993) , fertilizers (Williams et al., 1987) , and pesticides. In addition, Bernardini and Galli (1993) suggested that the maximum intensity declines if reached later in time by a given economy or society. However, most analyses have been performed only for industrialized countries. The need for further analysis is stressed by the current situation in rapidly-industrializing countries like South Korea that have a very high per capita apparent consumption of steel which is used in large exporting industries like car manufacture and ship building. 13 The industry in South Korea is heavily dependent on exports of these material-intensive products, determining the material intensity of the economic activities, rather than the intensity of society. Although the use of all materials in developing countries will certainly grow, per capita consumption may not be as high as in the industrialized countries. The level of saturation depends on many factors, including technology transfer but also infra-structural (including economic structure) policy choices (Jänicke et al, 1997) . Various economic indicators are commonly used at the level of individual industrial sub-sectors, e.g. value added, production value, value of shipments, while physical indicators are under the development for a wide range of industrial sub-sectors (Phylipsen et al., 1997) . Physical indicators are more closely linked to technical efficiency, but can only be used for relatively homogeneous activities (Schipper and 13 This case shows that the available statistics are not yet suited to prove that countries developing later in time will reach a lower saturation level, as stated by Bernardini and Galli (1993) . Meyers, 1992). Where energy services are explicitly modeled, they are usually assumed to be dependent on GDP or per-capita income, and price or cost. The link might be made through constant income and price elasticities of absolute demand for a service, through a logistic curve, or through income elasticities that fall with increasing income. In general equilibrium models, energy services demand may be estimated using a system of nested production functions ultimately delivering final consumption. An historical analysis of the European steel market showed that steel demand has also been reduced in periods of low economic growth, and showed that diffusion of new technology is mostly responsible for reduced material intensity, rather than income growth (Mannearts, 1997) . Steel production and industrial production can be modeled using growth in population, income, and developments in materials intensity (or intensity of use). Figure 10 depicts the relatively weak link between income per capita and apparent steel consumption. 
Buildings Sector Economic Drivers
In the buildings sector, we found a relatively strong relationship across countries between GDP per capita and final energy use in residential (R 2 =0.77) and commercial buildings (R 2 = 0.78) using data for 25 industrialized countries, China, and the regions of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Middle East (see Figures 11 and 12) . Energy use in buildings is not only influenced by economic variables, but also by climate, energy-related policies, house size or commercial building floor area, and consumer energyusing behavior patterns.
Energy consumption in residential buildings is strongly correlated with household income levels. Between 1973 and 1993, increases in total private consumption translated into larger homes, more appliances, and an increased use of energy services (water heating, space heating) in most industrialized countries (IEA, 1997d) . In general, countries with colder climates have higher incomes as well as higher heating levels. Household size, a key determinant of residential energy use, has grown with personal consumption expenditures in most industrialized countries, led by the United States where economic policies granting tax reductions on home loan interest have contributed to that country having the largest average home sizes in the world.
In developing countries, urban areas are generally associated with higher average incomes (Sathaye and Ketoff, 1991) . Wealthier populaces in developing countries exhibit consumption patterns similar to those in industrialized countries, where purchases of appliances and other energy-using equipment increase with gains in disposable income (WEC, 1995a) . Modern fuels such as kerosene, LPG, and electricity account for more than 90% of household energy consumption in high income homes in India, while lower income homes consume less than 50% of these commercial fuels (IEA, 1995) . An important finding, though, is that purchased household energy use rises less rapidly than income, suggesting that there is a level of saturation of energy-using equipment. In industrialized countries, household energy consumption has slowed as equipment penetration rates reach saturation (IEA, 1997d) .
In the commercial sector, the ratio of primary energy use to total GDP as well as commercial sector GDP fell in a number of industrialized countries between 1970 and the early 1990s. This decrease occurred despite large growth in energy-using equipment in commercial buildings, almost certainly the result of improved equipment efficiencies. Electricity use in the commercial sector shows a relatively strong correlation with commercial sector GDP, although there is a wide gap in electricity use at any given level of commercial sector GDP (IEA, 1997d) . 
Energy Intensity Trends
Energy intensity is the amount of energy used to perform a particular service such as producing a tonne of steel or powering a refrigerator. Technical progress generally leads to improved energy efficiency in technologies such as lights, vehicles, refrigerators, and manufacturing processes. In theory there are large potentials for energy savings. Using the thermodynamic concept of exergy, Ayres (1989) estimates that the U.S. uses its primary energy sources with only a 2.5% efficiency when fulfilling its energy services illustrating that there is a substantial theoretical potential for energy intensity improvement. Jochem (1989) has stated that a 50% reduction in energy demand in industrialized countries is technologically feasible, and in the long term even an 80% reduction of the current primary energy consumption is possible. For industrial processes thermodynamic principles are used to calculate the theoretical efficiency and hence the maximum potential for energy savings. Several authors have assessed the minimum energy requirements of an activity, e.g. (Szargut and Morris,1987; Wall, 1988) . Other studies have shown that considerable energy efficiency improvement can be realized (technically and economically) in the short term (10 to 15 years) with available technologies (Nakicenovic, 1993; Lovins and Lovins, 1991; WEC, 1995a; Worrell et al., 1997b) .
Industrial Sector Energy Intensity Trends
Energy intensity in the industrial sector can be measured using both economic and physical indices. Economic energy intensity measurements (e.g. energy use/economic output) are useful for characterizing the entire industrial sector or for those portions of the industrial sector that are not easily measured in physical terms. Physical energy intensity measurements (e.g. energy use/tonne of product), also called specific energy consumption, more accurately reflect trends in energy efficiency, but are typically limited to use in the energy-intensive industrial sub-sectors. Evaluations of these two means of measuring energy intensity have shown that economic energy intensity values do not always accurately reflect physical energy intensity trends, making physical energy intensity measurements the preferred metric where possible (Worrell et al., 1997b; Freeman et al., 1996) .
In aggregate terms, studies have shown that technical efficiency improvement of 1 to 2% per year is possible in the industrial sector and has occurred in the past (Ross and Steinmeyer, 1990) . Energy requirements can be cut by new process development. In addition, the amount of raw materials demand y = 155.84x 25 by a society tends to decline as countries reach certain stages of industrial development which leads to a decrease in industrial energy use. The accounting of trends in structural shift, material intensity and technical energy efficiency and their interactions can be extremely difficult. To understand trends in energy intensity, as shown in Figure 13 , it is important to analyze the structure of the industrial sector. Industrial energy use can be broken down into that of the energy-intensive industries (e.g. primary metals, pulp and paper, primary chemicals, oil refining, building materials) and the non-energy intensive industries (e.g. electronics and food).
Reduction of energy intensity is closely linked to the definition of structure, structural change, and efficiency improvement. Decomposition analysis is used to distinguish the effects of structural change and efficiency improvement. Structural change can be broken down into intra-sectoral (e.g. a shift towards more recycled steel), inter-sectoral (e.g. a shift from steel to aluminium within the basic metals industry). A wide body of literature describes decomposition analyses (see e.g. Schipper and Meyers, 1992; Ang, 1995) , and explains the trends in energy intensities, CO 2 intensities, and efficiency improvement. Decomposition analyses of the aggregate manufacturing sector exist mainly for industrialized countries (IEA, 1997d), but also for China (Sinton and Levine, 1994) , Taiwan (Ang and Pandiyan, 1997; Li et al., 1990 ) and selected countries including Eastern Europe (Park et al., 1993) . Table 6 summarizes the results of selected decomposition analyses.
The annual change in energy intensity in the industrial sector in the studies summarized in Table 9 varied between -0.1% and -6.6% per year. Generally, electricity intensity has remained constant, while fuel intensity has declined, reflecting the increasing importance of electricity (IEA, 1997d) . The results also clearly show that different patterns exist for various countries, which may be due to specific conditions as well as differences in driving forces such as energy prices and other policies in these countries (IEA, 1997d) . More detailed analyses on the sub-sector level are needed to understand these trends better, as well as their implications for bottom-up modeling. -1.4% 1 Note: Annual trends in aggregate energy intensity are decomposed into structural change (change in the activity mix of the manufacturing sector) and energy intensity (change in energy input per unit of output for each of the sub-sectors). Note that different methodologies, analysis periods, and aggregation levels have been used, which leads to different results. References: 1. Park et al., 1993 . 2. Sinton and Levine, 1994 . 3. Ang and Pandiyan, 1997 . 4. Howarth et al., 1991 . 5. Li et al., 1990 Changes in energy intensities can also be disaggregated into structural changes and efficiency improvements at the sub-sector level. In the iron and steel industry, energy intensity is influenced by the raw materials used (i.e. iron ore, scrap) and the products produced (e.g. slabs, or thin rolled sheets). A recent study on the iron and steel industry used physical indicators for production, distinguished six products to describe structure, and decomposed trends in seven countries which together produced almost half of the world's steel (Worrell et al., 1997b) . Figure 14 shows the trends in physical energy intensity in these countries, expressed as primary energy used per tonne of crude steel. The large differences in intensity among the countries are clearly shown, as well as the trends towards reduced intensity in most countries. Table 7 shows the results of the decomposition analysis for the seven countries for the period 1980 to 1991. Although the analysis covered only a relatively short period, it clearly shows the differences in processes (structural changes, efficiency improvement) underlying the energy intensity trend. Actual rates of energy efficiency improvement varied between 0.0% and 1.8% per year, while in the case of the restructuring economy of Poland the energy efficiency was reduced. 
Buildings Sector Energy Intensity Trends
Energy is used in buildings to provide many different services, which vary widely across regions and climates. Space heating accounts for a significant share of residential buildings energy use (see Figure 15 for the U.S.), while water heating, refrigeration, space cooling, and lighting are also important. In commercial buildings, other end-uses such as office equipment and lighting dominate. The amount of energy consumed in buildings is dependent on climate, building construction, appliances and equipment within the buildings, and energy use patterns of building occupants.
Overall energy intensity in the buildings sector can be measured using energy consumption per capita values. Between 1971 and 1990, global primary energy use per capita in the buildings sector grew from 16.5 GJ/capita to 20 GJ/capita. Figure 16 shows that buildings per capita energy use varied widely by region, with the industrialized and EIT regions dominating globally. Energy use per capita is higher in the residential sector than in the commercial sector in all regions, although average annual growth in commercial energy use per capita was higher during the period, averaging 1.7% per year globally compared to 0.6% per year for the residential sector.
While informative for making general comparisons, energy consumption per capita values do not adequately describe the actual energy intensity trends within buildings. Another means of measuring 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 GJ/tonne China Brazil Poland U.S.
France Japan Germany these trends is to calculate energy use per unit of building floor area. This measurement, however, best reflects space heating and cooling intensities, but does not provide adequate information regarding the energy use of equipment and appliances within the buildings. Thus, a meaningful understanding of buildings energy use trends requires disaggregation of this sector into residential and commercial buildings intensity trends in space conditioning as well as in equipment and appliances within the buildings. Figure 15 . Buildings Primary Energy End-Uses in the United States. References: U.S. Congress, OTA, 1992; IPCC, 1995. 
Residential Buildings
Energy intensity trends in residential space conditioning are affected by climate, building thermal integrity, and the heating and cooling equipment used. Space heating is an important end-use in the industrialized countries, the EIT region and in some developing countries, including half of China's residential and commercial buildings (Nadel et al., 1997) . Buildings that are centrally heated consume almost twice as much energy as those that are heated by small room heaters. The penetration of central heating doubled from about 40% of dwellings to almost 80% of dwellings in many industrialized countries between 1970 (IEA, 1997d . District heating systems are common in some areas of Europe and in the EIT region. In the former Soviet Union, district heating provides about 40% of residential space heating, with the remainder of the demand met through the use of small coal-fired boilers (U.S. Congress, OTA, 1993) . Energy use for residential space heating is estimated to be about 80% of final energy use in Poland and about 75% of final energy use in the Czech Republic and the former Soviet Union (Meyers et al., 1995) . Space heating is not common in most developing countries, with the exception of China, Korea, Argentina, and a few other South American countries (Sathaye et al., 1989) . In China, 75% of the residential buildings that require heating use coal-fired stoves to burn raw coal, coal cakes, briquettes, or biomass (Nadel et al., 1997) . Figure 17 shows that residential space heating energy intensities 14 declined in most industrialized countries (except Japan) between 1970 and 1992. Most of the decline was due to reduced heat losses in buildings, while a small portion of the savings were due to lowered indoor temperatures, more careful heating practices, and improvements in efficiency of heating equipment (IEA, 1997d; Schipper et al., 1996) . Region, 1971 . References: IEA, 1997a IEA, 1997b , UN, 1996 . Water heating, refrigeration, space cooling, and lighting, are the next largest residential energy uses, respectively, in most industrialized countries (IEA, 1997d) . In developing countries, cooking and water heating dominate, followed by lighting, small appliances, and refrigerators (Sathaye and Ketoff, 1991) . Appliance penetration rates increased in all regions between 1970 and 1990. Table 8 shows the growth in refrigerator and air conditioning equipment penetration rates for a number of industrialized countries during this period. In 1990, refrigerators were found in almost all households in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.S. (LBNL, 1998a ). (Penetration rates over 100% indicate that more than one unit is owned per household.) Refrigerators were found in 22% of urban residences in India (1993), 66% of urban residences in China (1995) , and 87% of urban residences in Thailand (1993) . Air conditioners were found in 8% and 58% of urban households in China and Thailand, respectively, those years (Turiel et al., 1998) . Figure 18 shows historical appliance penetration rates in urban and rural China for 1981 (State Statistical Bureau of China, 1996 .
The energy intensity of new appliances has declined over the past two decades; new refrigerators in the U.S. were 65% less energy-intensive in 1993 than in 1972. Table 9 shows energy intensity reductions in new refrigerators, freezers, clothes washers, dishwashers, and air conditioners in Denmark, former West Germany, and the U.S. (IEA, 1997d) . The decline in new appliance intensities does not always mean a reduction of the average energy intensity of the appliance stock in a given country due to other factors such as stock turnover rates, appliance lifetimes, and consumer choice. Table 10 gives unit energy consumption values for selected appliance stocks in 1970 and 1990 for France, Germany, Japan, and the U.S. The increase in refrigerator intensities seen in France, Germany, and Japan was due to purchases of larger refrigerators with more features (e.g. ice makers) during this period. The average volume of refrigerators in Japan more than doubled between 1973 and 1990, offsetting reductions in energy intensity (Schipper et al., 1996) . 
Commercial Buildings
Like residential buildings, energy intensity of commercial buildings is dependent upon both the building construction as well as the energy-using activities within the building. The type of building occupant clearly influences commercial buildings energy use because some buildings, such as hospitals and hotels, use energy continuously while others range from sporatic use (sports and entertainment facilities) to steady weekly use (office buildings) (IEA, 1997d) . In the U.S. 15% of commercial floor space is used continuously and slightly over 35% is used less than 50 hours per week (U.S. DOE, EIA, 1992; U.S. DOE, EIA, 1994).
Primary energy use per square meter of commercial sector floor area has gradually declined in most industrialized countries despite two countervailing trends: growth in the share of electricity and increases in electricity intensity (see Figure 19 ) and reduction in fuel use and fuel intensity (see Figure 21 ). Electricity use and intensity (MJ/m 2 ) increased rapidly in the commercial buildings sector as penetration of computers, other office equipment, air conditioning, and lighting has grown. Fuel intensity (PJ/m 2 ) declined rapidly in industrialized countries as the share of energy used for space heating in commercial buildings dropped due to thermal improvements in buildings (Krackeler et al., 1998) . 
Carbon Intensity Trends
Carbon intensity changes mainly as a result of fuel substitution, but also as a result of changes in technology or process in the energy supply chain. Thus, the largest shifts in carbon intensity have been associated with changes in the energy sources used for power generation (Nakicenovic and Grübler, 1996) . Smaller shifts have resulted from fuel switching in industrial, commercial and residential energy consumption.
Industrial Sector Carbon Intensity Trends
In industry, changes in carbon intensity and elasticity depend strongly on the sub-sector and its potential for fuel switching and efficiency improvement. For example, the use of biomass is historically connected with the forest products and food industries (e.g. bagasse in sugar making). New technologies and policies could make biomass use in other industrial sectors more economically attractive. Industries that use a large share of energy in biolers can convert to other fuels more easily than others. The growing market share of industrial cogeneration using relatively cheap gas turbine technologies is an example of a technology pushing the shift towards lower carbon fuels.
CO 2 emissions as a function of GDP of the industrial sector appear to stabilize in most countries, except for rapidly industrializing countries (IPCC, 1995) . This trend is the result of changing economic structure, improved energy efficiency, and reduced carbon intensity of the fuel mix. A shift towards less carbon-intensive fuels took place between 1971 and 1992 in most industrialized countries as well as in S. Korea Ang and Pandiyan, 1997) . The fuel mix has become more carbon-intensive in some developing countries such as China and Mexico (Ang and Pandiyan, 1997; Sheinbaum and Rodiguez, 1997) , although a trend away from coal to other fuels has also been seen in some developing countries (Han and Chatterjee, 1997) . The contribution of fuel mix changes to CO 2 emissions reduction has been small in most industrialized countries Golove and Schipper, 1997) . Electrification has grown in all sectors in almost all countries (Han and Chatterjee, 1997) . However, the Various authors have studied the changes in fuel mix and effects on total CO 2 emissions of the manufacturing industry in industrialized countries (Torvanger, 1991; Schipper et al., 1997) , China, South Korea, Taiwan (Ang and Pandiyan, 1997) , and Mexico (Sheinbaum and Rodiquez, 1997) . Although there has been a general overall trend towards lower carbon intensity (IPCC, 1992), Table 11 shows that fuel mix changes towards more carbon-intensive fuels occurred in industry in various countries. Such shifts may be related to availability of resources, policy measures, or change in the intra-sectoral structure. +0.4% -0.2% Ang & Pandiyan,1997 Denmark (1973 +0.6% -1.2% Schipper et al., 1997 Finland (1973 -2.1% -3.9% Schipper et al., 1997 France (1973 +0.2% -2.3% Schipper et al., 1997 West Germany (1973 +0.7% -2.5% Schipper et al., 1997 Italy (1973 +0.2% -3.1% Schipper et al., 1997 Japan (1973 +0.6% -4.0% Schipper et al., 1997 Japan (1979 +0.3% -0.8% Torvanger, 1991 Mexico (1987 +0.7% -2.5% Sheinbaum & Rodriquez, 1997 Norway (1973 -2.8% -3.9% Schipper et al., 1997 South Korea (1981 +0.2% -0.9% Ang & Pandiyan, 1997 Sweden (1973 -1.7% -6.3% Schipper et al., 1997 Taiwan (1980 +0.3% -0.2% Ang & Pandiyan, 1997 United Kingdom (1973 +0.9% -2.3% Schipper et al., 1997 United States (1973 +0.3% -2. 4% Schipper et al., 1997 United States (1979 +0.3% -0.2% Torvanger, 1991 Note: The changes in fuel mix represent the change in carbon emissions through a change in the final fuel mix of the power sector. The changes in carbon intensity represent the total changes in the energy consumed by industry, and is the product of changes in energy intensity, fuel mix, and fuel mix of the utilities.
In the iron and steel industry energy is used primarily for the reduction of iron oxides. The dominant process has been, and most likely will remain, the blast furnace, that uses coke as the primary reduction agent. Early blast furnaces, as well as some newly designed Brazilian blast furnaces, used charcoal as the reduction agent, requiring large quantities of wood. Later in the 19 th century, coke (from coal) proved to be a much better reductant in British blast furnaces. Today, coke is the dominant fuel, partially replaced by injected fuels (coal, oil, gas). New technologies make it possible to replace coke completely by other fuels including coal and natural gas. These technologies currently have only a very small share of the global iron production.
Energy use for the production of steel is reduced by changes in efficiency and increased use of secondary materials. This trend, although not observed in all countries, also leads to a relatively small change in fuel-mix, away from coal towards more electricity and other (gaseous) fuels.
15 This leads to a reduction of the direct carbon emissions from the iron and steel industry. These may partly be offset by the emissions of the power sector, if fossil fuels are used for power generation. Figure 21 depicts the trends in specific carbon emissions for major steel producing countries around the world and shows a declining carbon intensity of steelmaking in nearly all countries. The countries with relative low carbon intensities are those countries with a high share of secondary steelmaking (e.g. Italy), energy efficient practices (e.g. West Germany) or use of low carbon energy sources in steelmaking (e.g. Brazil) or power production (e.g. Brazil, France). , 1971-1994 (expressed in tonne C/tonne crude steel). References: Worrell et al., 1997b; Faaij et al., 1995. Note: carbon emissions from power production have been held constant at 1990 level for each country.
Buildings Sector Carbon Intensity Trends
Carbon intensity trends can be measured as either carbon emissions per unit of primary energy or per sectoral activity measurement (e.g. per capita and per square meter of floor area). Measuring carbon per unit of primary energy provides an indication of trends in the fuel mix, tracking whether more or less carbon-intensive fuels are being used to provide energy to buildings. Figure 22 shows that carbon intensity of the residential sector declined in most industrialized countries between 1970 and the early 1990s (LBNL, 1998a) . In the commercial sector, carbon dioxide emissions per meter of commercial floor area also dropped in most industrialized countries during this period (see Figure 23 ) even though carbon intensity for electric end-uses (kgC from electricity/m 2 ) increased in most industrialized countries, dropping only in France, Sweden, and Norway, countries that moved away from fossil fuels (Krackeler et al., 1998) .
In developing countries, biomass is often used in the residential sector, especially in rural areas. Increased urbanization, as well as increasing incomes and rural electrification, lead to rising carbon intensities in buildings because the mostly sustainable biomass is replaced with carbon-intensive fuels such as liquified petroleum gas (LPG), coal, and electricity generated by fossil fuels. In Brazil, the share of biomass energy used in the residential sector dropped from 90% in 1971 to just over 50% in 1992 as urban populations grew. In India, increasing incomes translated into replacement of biomass first with kerosene, then LPG, and finally electricity. This trend toward replacement of biomass fuels with commercial fuels in expected to continue in developing countries (IEA, 1995) . 
Conclusions
While the industrialized countries clearly dominate current energy use and greenhouse gas emissions, the large recent population and energy use growth patterns in many developing countries, coupled with trends in sector-specific indicators such as lower number of people per household and increased per capita vehicle ownership in these countries, clearly illustrate the potential for significant increases in energy use and greenhouse gas emissions in these areas as these countries improve their welfare levels. Analysts and policymakers interested in understanding future trends and the potential to mitigate emissions require detailed sectoral and regional information to identify appropriate measures and formulate effective policies.
Energy use and greenhouse gas emissions trends vary widely by region of the world and end-use sectors. Using various data sources and reallocation methods to improve on the IEA Energy Balances, we were able to disaggregate energy use and CO 2 emissions into the key end-use sectors of industry, transport, buildings, and agriculture and to provide historical data for these sectors both globally and regionally. Using the key elements of the Kaya formula, we discussed the driving factors underlying these historical trends, showing that many factors influence energy consumption and CO 2 emissions. The varying contribution of the different drivers regionally and over time helps to explain global and regional CO 2 emission trends. Scenarios of future energy use and greenhouse gas emissions should reflect an understanding of these historical trends and their driving forces.
Driving forces behind energy use and carbon emissions in the industrial sector include the country's state of economic development, consumption and trade patterns, relative costs of energy, and availability of resources. In the buildings sector, household expenditure levels, appliance and equipment penetration levels, and the share of population living in urban areas all affect energy use. Settlement patterns, infrastructure and social factors affect vehicle choice and kilometers traveled as much as income levels and fuel prices.
In addition, the energy intensity and other characteristics of the technologies used in each of these sectors play a role in determining the amount of energy consumed. Fuel choice, which is a key factor in determining carbon emissions, is strongly affected by local availability and non-price factors, which are difficult to take into account in models. These many influences on energy use and greenhouse gas emissions vary widely by country and region of the world, but are essential to understand the model results, and the consequences for policy making.
